The State(s), the Church(es), and the Nationalism

In the Western Balkans, the line between political power and religious authority is increasingly blurred. From Belgrade to Ppogorica to Skopje, churches do more than tend to faith. Religious leaders preserve historical narratives, shape national identity, and legitimise state power. Whether by glorifying convicted war criminals or framing geopolitical struggles as spiritual battles, religious leaders and institutions continue to wield influence far beyond the altar. This cross-border analysis examines how that influence manifests in Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, and what it means for the region’s democratic future.

Rewriting the Past in Serbia: How Church and State Shape Public Memory

In Serbia, historical revisionism and nationalist narratives fueling ethnic divides remain widespread. The recent burial of General Nebojša Pavković in the Alley of Meritorious Citizens in Belgrade is just an example. Pavković, former Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, was convicted of war crimes against Kosovo Albanians and sentenced by the Hague Tribunal to 22 years in prison for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war. Nevertheless, he was laid to rest alongside prominent cultural and political figures such as Ivo Andrić, Nobel prize for literature winner, prime minister Zoran Đinđić, writer Danilo Kiš, actors Dragan Nikolić and Milena Dravić, with all state and church honours.

Only a handful of independent media questioned his burial at the Alley. Pro-regime outlets instead glorified him as a “Serbian hero,” omitting any mention of his conviction. Before his funeral, Pavković was granted early release on medical grounds and flown from Finland to Serbia on an official government plane. President Aleksandar Vučić welcomed his return, saying he was ”happy that he got to see the day when he can see the free sky of his country from the free soil of his Serbia.” At the funeral, Bishop Dositej, speaking on behalf of Patriarch Porfirije, called Pavković “a symbol of the unjustly convicted” and claimed “his fate reflects the fate of our people, a people who know what it means to suffer, but also what it means to forgive, a people who do not renounce their heroes, but who will not exalt them out of pride, but out of gratitude.”

Apart from a small number of professional outlets, most mainstream media in Serbia not only provide space for historical revisionism, nationalist and other divisive narratives often coming from public officials and sometimes the Serbian Orthodox Church representatives, but also further fuel the same harmful narratives.

War Criminals Welcomed into Public Life

However, this is not an isolated case. Serbia, its public institutions, cultural spaces and media welcome convicted war criminals with open arms, endorsed by government officials. In 2018, Ratko Mladić, sentenced to life imprisonment for the Srebrenica genocide, phoned into a live show on TV Happy, greeting viewers and “sending kisses”. In the studio was also a convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj, who has upon serving his sentence, returned to political life without consequence. Šešelj is a regular guest on channels with national coverage and at the yearly Belgrade Book Fair, where he promotes his books. Pavković’s memoir was also promoted at the book fair in 2018, published by the Ministry of Defence and financed by taxpayers.

The Church as a Carrier of Nationalist Narratives

The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) holds great social and political power in the country and beyond, as it is deeply intertwined with Serbian national identity. Since the Milošević regime during the nineties to this day, the Church has often endorsed nationalist narratives and downplayed crimes committed by the Yugoslav Army and the Army of Republika Srpska. For instance, Šešelj was awarded three church decorations – two in 2015 from Bishop Filaret and Metropolitan Amfilohije, and another in 2022 from Bishop Irinej of Bačka. The same year, General Vladimir Lazarević, who was convicted for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity against Kosovo Albanians, also received the award. By bestowing honours on convicted war criminals, church officials symbolically reframe them as patriots and heroes, endorsing dominant nationalist narratives.

Genocide Denial Aligned with State Power

The Church is also complicit in relativising and denying the genocide in Srebrenica, aligning with state narratives that reject international rulings. Before travelling to New York in May 2024, ahead of the UN vote on the Srebrenica genocide resolution, President Vučić received a blessing from Patriarch Porfirije. Prior to this, the Patriarch stated in his Easter Epistle that “they are trying to declare the Serbian people genocidal,” echoing nationalist propaganda. This rhetoric went along with the state-backed “We are not a genocidal nation” campaign, which appeared in pro-regime media and public spaces, including billboards throughout Belgrade.

According to the Reporting Diversity Network report on hate speech in Serbia, this campaign resurfaced again in 2024 and was used as a propaganda tool against protesters, students, activists, civil society organisations, journalists, and opposition parties. Pro-government tabloids like Informer amplified hate speech by branding TV N1 as “anti-Serb” and Al Jazeera as “Islamist,” claiming these media were part of a plot to “teach Serbian children that Serbs are genocidal.”

This is also not an isolated case, as dominant hateful and harmful narratives are more commonly used against those deemed political opponents. As the Church often aligns with government narratives, any dissonant voice faces criticism and political pressure.

Cracks in the Narrative

Students from Novi Pazar, a mainly Muslim Bosniak town, walked for 16 days to Novi Sad for the one-year commemoration of the 16 victims of the train station canopy collapse. On their journey, they spent one night in the Studenica monastery, where they received a halal breakfast, as the media reported.

The Studenica monastery is under the jurisdiction of the diocese of Žiča, headed by Metropolitan Justin, the only bishop living in Serbia who openly supported the student protests and condemned the excessive use of force. Portal Nova recently reported that the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church launched an investigation against Metropolitan Justin as “the way he has led the Eparchy of Žiča so far is questionable”. Nova also reported that he “was seen followed by the Security and Information Agency”.

Religious Leaders and Historical Revisionism in Montenegro: A Powerful Tool for Shaping Public Opinion

In Montenegro, religious leaders, especially from the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) – the country’s dominant religious institution, often view the past and the present through a nationalist rather than religious lens. According to historian Miloš Vukanović, this approach is a vehicle for historical revisionism that fuels political polarisation and obstructs societal progress.

In May 2025, SOC Metropolitan Joanikije praised Pavle Đurišić as a “great hero of unbreakable character” during a liturgy in Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina. His remarks were met with condemnation from civil society, opposition, and Bosniak groups, since Đurišić led Chetnik forces responsible for the massacres of Muslims in northern Montenegro, Sandžak, and eastern Bosnia during World War II, and was even decorated by Nazi Germany.

Just weeks later, Archbishop and Metropolitan Metodije, speaking at a monastery in Šavnik, compared another Chetnik leader, convicted war criminal Draža Mihailović, to the bishop, poet and philosopher, Petar II Petrović-Njegoš, and described Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito as a “monster,” alleging that a post-war “Titoist-Ustasha coalition” committed genocide against Serbs.

The Controversial Monument

Despite public outrage, a bronze statue of Pavle Đurišić was illegally erected on private land in the village of Gornje Zaostro near Berane this August. Authorities have since ordered its removal. Politicians across the spectrum condemned the monument, except for the New Serbian Democracy party, whose leader, Andrija Mandić, now head of Montenegro’s parliament, criticised the arrest of the person involved in putting it up.

The crisis escalated on August 8, when Pobjeda and Vijesti journalists were attacked while reporting from the site. Metropolitan Metodije had held a liturgy there, unveiled the statue, and vowed to relocate it to a church, saying, “Let them tear it down.”

This event sparked further condemnation from civil society and officials. Metodije claimed Đurišić had defended Serbs during WWII, a clear act of historical revisionism which, according to Vukanović, is a deliberate political strategy aimed at provoking division and distracting from critical socioeconomic issues.

Revisionism as Identity Engineering

Vukanović argues that when revisionism is carried out across cultural and educational spheres, it aims to reshape collective identity and values. He draws a parallel to historical reinterpretations after the revolution of 1918 or World War II, but notes that today’s nationalist revisionism in Montenegro lacks the ideological and intellectual capacity of earlier movements.

“As an organisation with clear nationalistic goals, the SOC in the field of identity and cultural heritage thoroughly removes all elements that it considers foreign from its Belgrade perspective. Everything that is older than the Nemanjić dynasty or does not exist in the perception of someone from Belgrade needs to be removed, changed or assimilated. The unique expression of both Christianity and Orthodoxy is being thoroughly changed to adapt to the heterogeneous narrative that should show one alleged cultural layer of Serbs in the wider Balkan area,” he added.

For Vukanović, the SOC’s actions are part of a broader political project that includes denying Montenegrin identity, language, and statehood, as well as rehabilitating war criminals. He notes that while controversial claims have surfaced from leaders of other faith groups, none receive the media and political amplification given to the SOC.

Religious leaders, he believes, must get rid of their own misconceptions and prejudices. “Like the theory of evolution, critical historical science has never been a threat to faith.”

The Masterpiece of Manipulation

According to communicologist Radoje Cerović, religious narratives are among the most powerful propaganda tools ever created, designed to evoke deep emotional and instinctive reactions. He calls them a “masterpiece of manipulation,” often used for mobilisation.

Cerović argues that Balkan societies, unlike more stable democracies, are highly vulnerable to identity-based politics due to their history of conflict and contested national narratives. He warns that religiously driven nationalist elites are leading the region toward renewed violence by playing with volatile identity symbols.

“Balkan is a patchwork of identities in constant conflict, and it cannot be a democratic right of any political power to play with that. It’s like respecting the right of an arsonist to play with fire in an explosives warehouse. And we all play dumb, pretending the arsonist won’t light a match”, claims Cerović.

When Religious Discourse Becomes Political

Civil activist and docent at the University of Donja Gorica, Nikoleta Đukanović, thinks that the problem lies not only in religious institutions adopting political agendas, but in actively shaping them. In Montenegro, she says, political actors aligned with religious institutions use revisionist narratives to legitimise their actions and distract from their own failures in governance.

She warns that religious discourse has effectively become political, undermining Montenegro’s secular character and shrinking the space for democratic dialogue.

“Unfortunately, in Montenegro we are witnessing increasingly aggressive attempts to reinterpret the nineties, including the rehabilitation of war criminals, the relativisation of judgments by international courts and the replacement of individual responsibility with collective labelling”, says Đukanović.

Institutional Response

On June 12, the Prosecutor’s Office in Bijelo Polje opened an investigation into Metodije’s statements. He dismissed the accusations as “political persecution of the SOC.” Several NGOs also filed a complaint against Joanikije for inciting hatred by glorifying the Chetnik movement, but prosecutors dismissed the case on June 18, the International Day Against Hate Speech, sparking concern over institutional inaction.

The Ministry of Culture, meanwhile, ordered the removal of the Đurišić monument, and police arrested a suspect involved in its construction.

Media reporting

Darvin Murić, editor-in-chief of the fact-checking platform Raskrinkavanje, says that political manipulation of religious topics is widespread in Montenegrin media, often linked to the denial of crimes and glorification of criminals under the guise of religion. These narratives frequently emerge on portals in Montenegro and Serbia, as well as on social media.

A report by the Centre for Democratic Transition found persistent sharing of false historical data, including claims that 95% of Montenegrins identified as Serbs before 1918, even though ethnicity data was not collected at that time. These narratives, often echoed by SOC leaders, aim to reshape national identity.

The subtle power of faith: how the Serbian Orthodox Church shapes Influence in North Macedonia

In North Macedonia, the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Macedonian Orthodox Church–Ohrid Archbishopric (MOC) has been more than a matter of faith for decades. It has mirrored the shifting political currents of the Balkans. When the Macedonian Church declared its autocephaly in 1967, seeking full independence from the SOC, Belgrade rejected the move and continued to regard it as schismatic. This ecclesiastical rift lasted for more than half a century, shaping not only church relations but also the politics of identity and sovereignty in North Macedonia. The dispute became a reflection of a larger struggle for religious and national legitimacy.

The turning point came in May 2022, when the SOC officially recognised the MOC’s independence. The decision, announced by Patriarch Porfirije in Belgrade, was celebrated by many as an act of reconciliation between two sister churches. Yet the timing and framing of the event revealed deeper political undertones. Coming amid Serbia’s renewed push for regional soft power, the recognition helped Belgrade present itself as a stabilising actor, while quietly maintaining influence over religious and cultural ties in neighbouring states. The shared liturgy in Belgrade symbolised unity, but it also subtly reinforced Serbia’s image as a spiritual older brother.

The Soft Power of Religion

In the months that followed, analysts noted how Serbia’s broader strategy in North Macedonia went beyond diplomacy or economics — it relied heavily on soft power rooted in culture, media, and religion. The SOC, with its historical authority and transnational network, has served as one of Belgrade’s most enduring instruments of influence. Serbian cultural centres, church-organised events, and media coverage often intertwine faith with narratives of shared “Slavic brotherhood,” Orthodox unity, and moral conservatism. Through this lens, Serbia positions itself as both a guardian of tradition and a counterbalance to Western and EU values, a stance that resonates in parts of Macedonian society still nostalgic for the bonds of the Yugoslav era.

This soft power sometimes spills over into the information sphere, blending religious symbolism with geopolitical messaging. A clear example was observed during the celebration of Saint Sava Day, an event honouring the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church. What began as a cultural and spiritual commemoration in several Macedonian cities carried a parallel layer of messaging, including media coverage that promoted narratives sympathetic to Russia and critical of the European Union. Pro-Russian outlets and some religious figures used the occasion to frame Russia as a protector of Orthodoxy and peace, contrasting it with a morally “corrupted” West. In this way, religion became a vessel for propaganda, subtly shaping perceptions about where Macedonian loyalties should lie.

Sacred Sites as Symbols of Influence

Beyond discourse and ceremony, the contest for religious and cultural influence extends to physical heritage. The restoration of the Matejče Monastery, a centuries-old Orthodox site near Kumanovo, reflects how sacred spaces become symbols of competing narratives. Once associated closely with the Serbian Church, the monastery’s revival has been promoted as a gesture of religious unity, but also as a reminder of historical Serbian presence in Macedonia. The site’s reconstruction has thus become more than a cultural project. It embodies how religion continues to mediate questions of identity, ownership, and historical legitimacy.

Independence in Name, Influence in Practice

Recent events show that the influence of the SOC and its allies remains far from over, even after formal recognition of the MOC’s independence. In October 2025, Bishop Marko of the Macedonian Orthodox Church visited several Serbian and Russian Orthodox Churches across Europe, but skipped visits to Macedonian parishes. The gesture drew attention of local media, which interpreted it as a symbolic alignment with Belgrade and Moscow rather than Skopje. For observers, it was a reminder that ecclesiastical independence does not necessarily mean ideological or political autonomy. Such gestures reveal how deeply intertwined church diplomacy and geopolitics remain in the region.

Taken together, these developments show that the Serbian Orthodox Church’s influence in North Macedonia is neither overtly aggressive nor purely spiritual. It operates through subtle networks of loyalty, culture, and shared symbolism. The 2022 recognition allowed Serbia to recast its role as a benevolent patron rather than a rival. The continued resonance of Saint Sava celebrations, the politics of monastery restorations, and the cross-border travels of bishops all underscore how religion remains a living field of soft power.. In a region where history, faith, and politics are inseparable, the line between spiritual guidance and political influence continues to blur, and North Macedonia stands as a case study in how that balance is negotiated every day.

Authors: Milena Radonjić, Despina Kovačevska, Anja Anđušić

Photo: Freepik